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The objectives of this article are to: (1) discuss the significance offoreign direct investment; (2)
analyze important nuances of bilateral investment treaties; (3) explain the importance of investor-
state arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in bilateral investment treaties; (4) cover the
two most common types of rules used in investor-state arbitration hearings; and (5) make general
recommendations for improvement of a developing nation's investment laws. The conclusions of
this article are: (1) developing nations should promote foreign investment in order to gain access to
financial, technological, managerial and other resources that they need; (2) accordingly, developing
nations should pursue bilateral investment treaties with foreign countries whose business firms
possess those resources; (3) developing nations' investment laws need to be fine-tuned in order to
maximize growth and investment; (4) in each bilateral treaty, a developing nation should agree to
investor-state arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism whenever disagreements arise be-
tween the developing nation's government and private business firms of the other country; (5)
developing nations should become signatories to the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention; and (6) in any investor-state arbitration hearing which
arises, the developing nation should insist on the utilization of rules adopted by the ICSID
Convention.
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I. Objectives of the Article
The objectives of this article are to: (1) describe the significance of foreign direct invest-
ment; (2) discuss significant nuances of bilateral investment treaties; (3) explain the impor-
tance of investor-state arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in bilateral
investment treaties; (4) cover the two most common types of rules used in investor-state
arbitration hearings; and (5) make general recommendations for improvement of a devel-
oping nation's investment laws.
H. Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) occurs "when an investor based in one country (the
home country) acquires another asset in another country (the host country) with the in-
tent to manage that asset."' FDI often occurs when a host country is in need of financial,
technological, managerial, and other resources that are necessary for the development of
its economy. World FDI surged from only $200 billion in 1990 to more than $1 trillion
in 2000.2
FDI has a dramatic impact on a host country. A host country has a sovereign right to
regulate FDI and to determine the role it will play in its economic development. A host
country's regulation of FDI, however, is in conflict with the creation of a liberal interna-
tional economic system designed to maximize the economic prosperity of both the home
and the host countries. As a result, there has been a gradual development of international
law restricting the host country's control over FDI by establishment of international arbi-
tral tribunals. Perhaps the best example of this type of international law is the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,
often referred to as the Washington Convention. The Washington Convention created
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and placed it
under the aegis of the World Bank. The function of ICSID is to facilitate arbitration
proceedings between a host country government and investors in the home country. IC-
SID provides the facilities and procedural framework for international arbitration, but
ICSID itself does not arbitrate disputes. Rather, ICSID provides guidelines for selection
of arbitrators and conducting proceedings. Under those guidelines, the majority of the
arbitrators must be nationals of countries other than the two parties involved in the
dispute.3
m. Bilateral Investment Treaties
On the other hand, a host country may voluntarily qualify its sovereign ability to con-
trol FDI by entering into a bilateral investment treaty with the home country govern-
1. Press Release, World Trade Org., Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (Oct. 9, 1996), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm; Eric M. Burt, Comment, Developing Countries
and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. REv. 1015, 1019 (1997).
2. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC.
McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. LJ. 337, 338 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Foreign Direct Investment].
3. Brian J. Farrar, Note, To Legislate or to Arbitrate: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Investment Policy After
FINSA and the Benefits ofInternational Arbitration, 7 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 167, 180 (2008).
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ment.4 Thus, governments of the home country and the host country have often
established parameters over foreign investment by negotiation of a Bilateral Investment
Treaty(BIT). More than 2,500 BITs currently exist, affecting 170 countries. 5 Most of the
liberalization of host country investment requirements has come through the proliferation
of BITs. 6
BITs grant investors a number of rights, as well as remedies to enforce those rights.
The substantive investors' rights commonly found in BITs include the following: (1) guar-
anteed payment of adequate compensation in the event an investment is expropriated;7 (2)
prohibition of the host country enacting currency controls to prevent the free flow of
capital; (3) prohibition of discrimination against the investor in favor of the host country's
citizens or other foreigners; (4) fair and equal treatment by the host country;8 (5) provision
of full protection and security of the investment by the host country; (6) a guarantee by
the host country that the investor will not be treated less favorably than the minimum
standard required by customary international law; and (7) an agreement of the host coun-
try to honor all commitments made to the investor.9
The following factors account for the perpetuation of the BIT regime: (1) negative
consequences may follow if a nation withdraws from a BIT (e.g., enticing future capital
flows into that country may become more difficult or more expensive, and a perception
that the withdrawing country has become politically risky); (2) BITs ordinarily initially
cover a period of ten to fifteen years, with no right of termination of the treaty during that
period; and (3) most BITs contain a "continuing effects" clause, which provides that in-
vestments made, acquired, or approved prior to the date of the termination of the treaty
will be protected by the treaty's provisions for a further term of ten to twenty years. o
BITs have become the mainstay of the development of the international investment law
regime, but this was not always intended to be the case. Since the creation of the Interna-
4. Burt, supra note 1, at 1027.
5. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification ofInternational Investment Law, 13 LAW & Bus. REv. Am. 155,
156 (2007) [hereinafter Salacuse, Treatification].
6. Burt, supra note 1, at 1027.
7. If the host nation issues a "compulsory license" enabling a foreign investor's intellectual property to be
used by the host nation to fulfill a public need (e.g., for public health), the issuance of that license may be
considered to be an expropriation of the investor's intellectual property. If this issue goes to arbitration, the
arbitrator must consider not only (i) the impact of the government-authorized compulsory license on the
investment (i.e., the level of deprivation) and (ii) whether the investor's expectations and reliance on the
patent rights as a basis for investment are reasonable and legitimate, but also (iii) the character of the govern-
ment action, including the regulatory purpose behind the compulsory license. See Christopher Gibson, A
Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 Am. U. INT'L L.
REV. 357, 414 (2010).
8. At least one commentator has argued that a host country's violation of its obligations under the World
Trade Organization would also be a violation of its obligation to treat investors in a fair and equal manner.
See generally, Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Bilateral Investment Treaties: Arbitrating Investor-State Disputes: Are
WTO Violations Also Contrary to the Fair and Equitable Treatment Obligations in Investor Protection Agreements?,
11 ILSA J. Ir'L & Comp. L. 287 (2005).
9. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1530-32 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, The Legit-
imacy Critis].
10. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 471-72
(2010). Notwithstanding those impediments to ending a BIT, four countries have recently done so: Bolivia,
Ecuador, Russia, and Venezuela. Id. at 471.
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tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, it has been the goal of many devel-
oped, capital-exporting nations to secure a multilateral agreement on investment that
would create a uniform body of foreign investment law. However, this project has been
often rejected by developing, capital-importing nations and they have argued against both
the formation of such an agreement, as well as the principles on which it would be based.II
The "umbrella" clause is a provision commonly found in many BITs that requires each
of the two contracting nations to observe all investment obligations they have assumed
with respect to investors from the other contracting nation. This type of clause brings
otherwise independent investment arrangements between a contracting nation and private
investors from the other contracting nation under the treaty's "umbrella of protection."
Its purpose is to create an inter-national obligation to observe investment agreements that
investors may enforce when the BIT confers a direct right of recourse to arbitration.
More specifically, the history of the umbrella clause makes clear that it was designed to
allow for any breach of a relevant investment contract to be resolved under the treaty in an
international forum.12 At least one commentator has contended that (1) a BIT's umbrella
clause should also apply to obligations arising under a separate contract between an inves-
tor of the home country and the government of the host nation; and therefore (2) a BIT
tribunal should be able to exercise jurisdiction over breach of contract claims, including a
situation when the contract contains an exclusive forum selection clause.' 3
IV. Investor-State Arbitration
If a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) contains an Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) provi-
sion, investors are given the right to, and provided the means to, initiate an arbitral pro-
ceeding against a foreign government under international law, seeking redress for
violation of the BIT by the foreign government.14 In ISA cases, the arbitrator is empow-
ered to interpret the applicable relevant provisions of the BIT as well as the contract
between the arbitrating parties.' 5 ISA has enjoyed a remarkable growth in recent years;
now, there are more than forty new cases each year.16
11. Paul M. Blyschak, State Consent, Investor Interests, and the Future ofInvestment Arbitration: Reanalyzing the
Jurisdiction ofInvestor-State Tribunals in Hard Cases, 9 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 99, 106-07 (2009).
Although BITs are the predominant force in international investment law, some regional provisions are sig-
nificant-for example, the European Union and NAFTA. Some multilateral instruments are also important:
for example, the WTO, OECD, World Bank, and U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. See gener-
ally Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Com.
REG. 33 (2009).
12. Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations,
and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GLo. MASON L.
REV. 135, 142 - 43 (2006).
13. Id. at 174.
14. Steven P. Finizio, Ethan G. Shenkman & Julian Davis Mortensen, Recent Developments in Investor-State
Arbitration: Effective Use ofProvisional Measures, 15 GLOBAL ARBETRATION REv., http://www.wilmerhale.com/
uploadedFiles/WilmerHaleSharedContent/Files/Editorial/Publication/investor state-arbitration.pdf. (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
15. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104
A.J.I.L. 179, 225 (2010).
16. William W. Burke-White et al., Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in
Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALEJ. INT'L L. 283, 284 (2010).
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Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example of
an ISA provision. Chapter 11 allows investors of one NAFTA party (the United States,
Canada, or Mexico) to bring claims directly against the government of another NAFTA
party before an international panel of arbitrators.' 7 Because NAIFTA Article 1121 waives
the local remedies rule, an investor is not required to exhaust his remedies in a domestic
court before filing a Chapter 11 claim.' 8 Under Chapter 11, investors may initiate arbi-
tration against the NAFTA party pursuant to either the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or the Rules of the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).19 NAFTA Chapter 11
was the first instance of an investor-state provision allowing such claims by developed
nations against each other and has caused some concern in both the United States and
Canada.20
A few commentators have opined that Chapter 11 disadvantages the three NAFTA na-
tions by inhibiting their investment lawmaking power and subjecting them to claims of
foreign investors. 21 They contend that Chapter 11, although originally intended to be a
defensive mechanism for investors, has become an offensive weapon too often used by
investors against the NATA nations. 22 Nevertheless, the majority of commentators have
praised Chapter 11 because of its essential role in protecting foreign investors, while ac-
knowledging that Chapter 11 could potentially be misused by those investors.23
Notwithstanding the criticism that ISA has often resulted in inconsistent decisions in
similar cases, ISA remains the most common dispute resolution mechanism adopted in
BITs.24 Critics should look to the outcomes of arbitration proceedings in order to evalu-
ate the legitimacy of international investment protection and the capacity of arbitrators to
live up to the standards of independence, impartiality, and judicial judgment. If they
would do so, they would find that arbitrators not only achieve efficient and effective dis-
pute settlement, but they also, through their independent and impartial application of the
governing law, foster the international rule of law and an investment-friendly environ-
ment. 25 It is also true that investment jurisprudence provides the necessary leeway to
implement their policy choices and to legislate in a self-determined and sovereign man-
17. Ray C. Jones, Notes and Comments, NAFTA: Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to
be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REv. 527, 528 (2002). Research has shown that recent
developments in legal education around the world have resulted in a diversity of backgrounds and nationali-
ties among the chosen arbitrators. No longer is there a small "exclusive club" of arbitrators. The number of
arbitrators has grown and there is a now a greater variety of them to choose from. Tai-Heng Cheng, Prece-
dent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FoRDHM1,A INT'L L. J. 1014, 1047 - 48 (2007).
18. Jacob S. Lee, No "Double-Dipping" Allowed: An Analysis of Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican
States and the Article 1121 Waiver Requirement for Arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2655, 2657 (2001).





24. See generally David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an
Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 N.W. J. Iwr'L L. & Bus. 383 (2010).
25. Charles N. Brower et al., Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment
Law?, 9 CM. J. INT'L L. 471, 497-98 (2009).
FALL 2013
278 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ner.26 If one prefers, by contrast; a world where property interests must yield to any other
public interest, where the host nation's contractual promises have no real value in the face
of changed political preferences, and where good governance standards cannot be en-
forced; one can do away with BITs and ISA.27 To do so, however, would lead to a chill in
the global economy that is not in the best interest of host nations or their citizens.28
Therefore, BITs and ISA are "legitimate mechanisms for structuring and stabilizing inter-
national investment relations without institutionalizing a pro-investor bias or disregarding
the host state's legitimate power to regulate."29
A commonly-held belief has been that investment arbitrators, in an effort to please both
parties and to get repeat appointments, often issue compromise decisions that give each
party some, but not all, of what he is asking for. Another frequently-held belief maintains
that investment arbitrators are usually biased against the host nation and are more likely to
give a favorable decision to investors.30 However, a recent study tends to refute both of
these common beliefs. The study revealed that investment arbitrators are not prone to
give compromise awards or to decide in favor of investors. Instead, investment arbitrators
usually do what they are supposed to do-issue an unbiased decision based on the evi-
dence in each case. The study emphasized that investment arbitrators strive to be fair and
impartial in their decisions because they place a high value on their professional
reputations.3'
Additionally, a recent study indicated that, in general, the outcome of investment treaty
arbitration was not reliably associated with (1) the degree of economic development of the
respondent host nation; (2) whether the arbitrator was from an economically developed
nation or an underdeveloped one; or (3) a combination of the first two variables. 32
None of the reported ISA cases involved the United Arab Emirates or any other Arab
country. But Turkey was a party in one of the cases.33
One criticism of ISA is that it requires the host nation to make an exception to its
sovereign immunity. But ISA and sovereign immunity have similar justifications. Both
came into existence in response to a proliferation of interactions between investor firms
and foreign host countries. Both aim to achieve access to legal remedies by investor firms
whenever they interplay with foreign states. Both strive to avoid the effect of political
influence whenever investor firms make demands upon foreign host countries. Toward
those ends, both desire to attain a compromise between the interests of investor firms in
pursuing their remedies and the interests of foreign host countries in conducting their
affairs without interference. Accordingly, both serve as important milestones on the evo-
26. Id.
27. Id. at 498.
2 8. Id.
29. Id.
30. Blyschak, supra note 11, at 118. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Recent Book on International Law: Book
Review, 102 A.J.I.L. 909 (2008) (reviewing Gus vAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
PUBLIC LAw (2007)).
31. Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Erploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitra-
tors, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 47, 89-90 (2010).
32. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Theory Arbitration, 50 HARv. INr'L L.J. 435,
487 (2009).
33. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1,
28 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims].
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lutionary continuum from a "might makes right" perspective on international relations to
one that is grounded in rules. Because of these similar justifications, the law of sovereign
immunity can serve as a model for the continuous improvement of ISA.34
A. PROPOSALS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBTTRAL DECISIONS
Investor-State Arbitration is so new that most of the claims and decisions employing
this apparatus have occurred in the past decade. 35 As a result, many parts of the law and
procedure remain to be developed.36 The calls for an appellate mechanism emanating
from some quarters are partly in response to the fact that, in some of the recent cases,
Canadian courts have been asked to help in determining the future viability of ISA.37
Under NAFTA, which is procedurally based on the model of international commercial
arbitration, a judicial review of an arbitral award can be initiated by a disputing party in
the national courts of the jurisdiction in which the arbitration occurred pursuant to that
jurisdiction's law.3 8 Those calling for judicial review of arbitral decisions argue there is a
need for a second opinion on each arbitration's issues of fact and law and a need for
correctness and consistency, and that those two needs trump the advantages of finality of
an arbitrator's decision. 39
A number of countries around the world have adopted ISA as the dispute resolution
mechanism in its BITs, including Argentina; 40 Bolivia;41 China;42 Czech Republic;43 Ecua-
dor;44 Japan;45 Mexico; 46 and many others.
V. Rules Used in B.I.T. Arbitral Hearings
The two most important sources of arbitration rules that may be applied in an arbitra-
tion case arising under a BIT are (1) the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law Arbitration Rules, which have each been used in 20 percent of the ISA cases;
34. Charles H. Brower II, Emerging Dilemmas in International Economic Arbitration: Mitsubishi, Investor-State
Arbitration, and the Law of State Immunity, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907, 911-14 (2005).
35. Ian Laird et al., Finality Versus Consistenty: Does Investor-State Arbitration Need an Appellate System?, 7 J.





40. Burke-White et al., supra note 16, at 289-90.
41. Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of Interna-
tional Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 725, 748 (2008).
42. Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People's
RepublicofChina, 15 CARDozoJ. INT'L & Comp. L. 73, 73 (2007); Jie Wang, Investor-State Arbitration: Where
Does China Stand?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 493, 493 - 94 (2009).
43. Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessay
Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301, 350 (2004).
44. See generally Eric Gillman, The End oflnvestor-State Arbitration in Ecuador? An Analysis ofArticle 422 of
the Constitution of2008, 19 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 269 (2008).
45. Koichi Miki, Investment Treaties and Investor-State Arbitration: The Japanese Perspective, 19 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 301, 303 (2008).
46. Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in Investment Dispute Settlement, 26
PENN. ST. IrT'L L. REV. 252, 275 (2007).
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and (2) the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) Convention Rules, which have been used in the majority of all ISA cases.47 This
is due to the fact that most of the BITs include a provision expressing a choice to use the
ICSID Rules.48
A. UNcrnRAL ARBYTRATION RULES
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law was created by the
United Nations in 1966 "to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the
law of international trade."49 Its member states are elected by the U.N.'s General Assem-
bly. Currently, sixty nations are members of UNCITRAL.s0 The United Arab Emirates
is not a member of UNCITRAL.st
Numerous countries have relied upon the UNCITRAL Model Law as a foundation for
their national arbitration laws. 52 The Model Law outlines the arbitration rules to be en-
acted b'y a nation and requires courts to provide assistance to arbitrators.53 Despite the
fact that some national arbitration laws have no relationship to the UNCITRAL Model
Law, many of those same laws still facilitate the arbitration process.54 For example, the
English Arbitration Act of 1996 recognizes the enforceability of peremptory orders of the
tribunal compelling the attendance of witnesses and the production or preservation of
evidence.55
In 1976, the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law drafted and later adopted
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, an extensive set of procedural rules to be used in
international commercial arbitrations. Notwithstanding their sweeping popularity, they
need to be amended to incorporate evolutionary developments in international arbitral
practice. As a result, UNCITRAL may tweak the rules. 56
In 1985, UNCITRAL drafted and later adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration.57 Parties to bilateral investment agreements that have
adopted the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are required to use those rules in their ISAs.58
Almost 100 arbitration cases have been decided using UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.59
The Arbitration Rules may be selected pursuant to either a BIT or a regional multilateral
47. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims, supra note 33, at 40.
48. See generally Antonio R. Parra, Dep. Sec'y-Gen., Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ICSID
and Bilateral Investment Treaties, NEWS FROM ICSID (Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Washing-
ton, D.C.), Spring 2000, at 11-14.
49. FAQ-Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
en/about/origin-faq.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
50. Id.
51. See generally id.
52. Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, at 82.





58. Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, at 82-83.
59. Paul D. Friedland et al., Book Note, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules:A Commentary, 101 A.J.I.L. 519,
519-20 (2007).
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investment regime (e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement).60 Although the Rules
were originally designed for use in commercial cases, they were recently modified in order
to make them more compatible with treaty-based arbitration cases. 61 The Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal illustrated how the UNCITRAL Rules could be successfully employed in
the resolution of claims brought by private parties against a sovereign nation.62 Presently,
these rules are used in a variety of situations: commercial cases, arbitrations under bilateral
and multilateral investment treaties, and in preferential trade and investment
agreements. 63
Host nations prefer arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to some other
tribunals (e.g., the International Chamber of Commerce); this is because the Rules have
been written by the United Nations, a body held in high esteem." In comparison with
ordinary commercial arbitration, the Rules are not perceived as much of a threat to na-
tional sovereignty. 65 Private investors in home countries like the UNCITRAL rules be-
cause they offer the flexibility of ad hoc arbitration and the security provided by a widely-
accepted set of procedural rules.66 All parties appreciate the confidentiality of UNCI-
TRAL arbitration and its relatively strict jurisdictional requirements.67
It should be emphasized that the UNCITRAL Rules are procedural only. The substan-
tive law to be applied in each arbitral hearing is the law of the place in which the arbitra-
tion is held.68
1. Judicial Review
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34(2) states six possible grounds for judicial review of
an arbitral decision employing the UNCITRAL Rules: (1) invalidity of the agreement to
arbitrate; (2) lack of notice to a party or other inability to present the case; (3) inclusion in
the award of matters outside the scope of submission; (4) irregularity in the composition
of the tribunal or arbitral procedure; (5) non-arbitrability of the subject-matter; and (6)
violation of domestic public policy. 69 In the review, the court would not be allowed to
consider possible errors of law or to review the application of the facts to the law.7 0 Ac-
cordingly, the selection of the place of arbitration is a critical factor relating to judicial
review and enforcement.7 i If one is going to ask a domestic court to review an interna-
tional arbitral decision, the claimant in particular wants to be sure that it will receive a fair






65. Friedland et al., supra note 59, at 519-20.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REv. INfT'L ARB. 175,
193 (2007).
69. Laird et al., supra note 35, at 288.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 289.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 289.
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obtain judicial review in Canadian courts in NAFTA cases have usually failed, as those
courts have usually exhibited a pro-arbitration policy, judicial deference to arbitral deci-
sions, and an appreciation of their advantage of finality.74
2. Recent Changes to the UNCITRAL Rules
The UNCITRAL Rules were not originally tailored for use in ISA.75 The public-inter-
est difference between ISA and commercial arbitration has direct implications for the con-
duct of the arbitration. 76 "For example, there may be a need for particular procedural
arrangements, such as separate phases on jurisdiction and admissibility before the submis-
sion of a statement of claim, amicus curiae briefs, and consolidation of claims and
hearings."77
The following amendments were made to make the UNCITRAL Rules more compati-
ble with ISA- (1) limitation of the scope of the Rules to disputes relating to a contract; (2) a
statement that the Rules are subject to the controlling national arbitration law of a partic-
ular dispute (although the controlling law is not defined); (3) a statement that service upon
a state is sufficient if it is delivered to an organ of the state's government and complies
with the law of that state pertinent to service of process; and (4) a statement that the
arbitrator is empowered to control the arbitration's timetable as he deems appropriate, so
long as each party receives equal treatment and an opportunity to present its case.78
3. Judicial Review of a UNCITRAL Rules Case: S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada
Relying on principles of indirect control, an arbitral tribunal created in accordance with
Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Rules found that the claimant, a family-
owned corporation, was an investor in Canada despite the fact its Canadian affiliate was
owned only by the family members and not by the corporation.79 The tribunal also found
that Canada had violated NAFTA Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1105 (minimum
standard of treatment) by forbidding the claimant to export a certain chemical to the
United States for a period of time. Canada sought judicial review by the Federal Court of
Canada, contending that the claimant lacked a Canadian investment, which deprived the
tribunal of jurisdiction.80 The court decided that Canada had waived its jurisdictional
objections.81 In the alternative, the court denied Canada's contentions based on the "cor-
rectness" of the tribunal's interpretation of Chapter 11's jurisdictional provisions and on
the "reasonableness" of their application to the facts of the particular case. 82 Notwith-
standing the above, the court did confirm that it possessed a limited scope of judicial
review when it stated that "the Canadian submission that the Tribunal erred in law in
74. Id. at 290-92.
75. Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms
to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAW & Bus. REv. Am. 885, 912 (2007).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 913.
78. Id. at 913-16.
79. Charles H. Brower II (David C. Caron, Ed.), International Decision: S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Federal
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applying Articles 1102 and 1105 in this case is a matter outside the Court's authority
under Article 34 [of the Commercial Arbitration Code] to judicially review. A dispute
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, even if wrongly decided on a
point of fact or law, cannot be judicially reviewed."83
VI. ICSID Convention Rules
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is an in-
stitution of the World Bank.84 ICSID was founded in 1966 pursuant to the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(commonly referred to as the "ICSID Convention" or "Washington Convention").85 As
of 2009, 156 countries have signed the ICSID Convention. The United States is also a
party to the ICSID Convention, and American citizens have frequently been parties in
ICSID arbitrations. 86
The ICSID arbitrates investment conflicts between member states serving as host na-
tions and individual investors of other nations. Pursuant to the ICSID Convention, all
investment disputes must be arbitrated before the ICSID tribunal. The tribunal attempts
to be a fair arbiter of the rights, responsibilities, and claims of all parties and makes a
special effort to remove domestic politics and domestic judicial influence from the pro-
ceedings.87 Despite the fact it is not a permanent arbitral tribunal, the ICSID provides a
legal and organizational framework for arbitration hearings.88 According to the ICSID,
"if the parties cannot agree on the place of arbitration, then the arbitration will take place
at the World Bank's offices in Washington," D.C., United States.89
ICSID arbitration is subject to four conditions: "(1) the parties must have agreed to
submit their dispute for settlement under the ICSID; (2) the dispute must be between a
contracting state to the ICSID (or a subdivision or agency of that state) and the national of
another contracting state; (3) the dispute must be a legal dispute; and (4) the dispute must
arise directly out of an investment made in the host contracting state."90 If the parties
consent to ICSID arbitration, all other remedies or forums for resolution are excluded. 91
Tribunals convened under the ICSID Convention are truly de-localized; unlike UNCI-
TRAL arbitrations, ICSID arbitrations are not subject to the law of any place of arbitra-
tion, and states that are party to the ICSID Convention promise to give awards immediate
effect.92 States are prohibited from exercising diplomatic protection after a claim has been
83. Laird et al., supra note 35, at 293-94.
84. About ICSID, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=ShowHome&pageName=AboutICSIDHome (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
85. Id.
86. Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J.
Comp. L. 233, 247 (2006).
87. Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, at 81.
88. Id.
89. Anoosha Boralessa, The Limitations ofParty Autonomy in ICSID Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
253, 298 (2004).
90. Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, at 81-82.
91. Id.
92. Bjorklund, supra note 68, at 193.
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filed with the ICSID, except in cases of failure to comply with an award. 93 Additionally,
once a state has agreed to arbitration, it is not allowed to unilaterally revoke its consent or
to require an exhaustion of local remedies (unless the agreement provides that exhaustion
of local remedies must precede arbitration). 94 After the arbitrator has made an award, the
host nation must recognize the award as binding and must enforce the monetary obliga-
tions imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of a court in the host nation.95
During the past two decades, the ICSID Rules have become the most commonly used
rules in ISA cases. 96 The ICSID oversaw only twenty-six ISA cases between 1966 (the
year the ICSID Convention was created) and 1991.97 During the past twenty years, how-
ever, the ICSID has overseen 131 cases, with another 124 cases pending. 98
The ICSID Convention, in Article 48(3), requires written awards that "deal with every
question submitted to the Tribunal, and. . . [that] state the reasons upon which it is
based."99 Article 54 provides that "each Contracting State shall recognize an award... as
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations. . . within its territory as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State."100 There is no possibility of appeal, and there are no
grounds for challenging an investor-state award in court.' 0
These rules also result in the most transparency of the arbitration process. Trans-
parency has several advantages, including the following: (1) higher-quality decision mak-
ing because those making the decision are aware that third parties may scrutinize it; (2)
preservation of the arbitration hearing record, a prerequisite for annulment of the arbitral
decision; (3) democratic values and recognition of human rights are more fully afforded;
(4) the parties' interests are better protected; (5) decisions in similar cases will be more
consistent because prior cases are more likely to be considered in rendering a decision; (6)
more legitimacy of the decision; (7) more accountability of host countries to the public; (8)
promotion of systemic reform; and (8) promotion of the rule of law in the host country
because it demonstrates an example of a successful dispute resolution method that could
be experimented with by the host country.102
An issue frequently encountered by ICSID arbitrators is whether an investment transac-
tion is covered by both Article 25 of the ICSID Convention on jurisdiction of the Centre
and the applicable BIT.103 Prior arbitration cases that have considered this issue mandate
tribunals to evaluate each investment transaction from all aspects of the parties' relation-
93. Leal-Arcas, supra note 11, at 82.
94. Id.
95. Giuliana Cane, The Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary or Ineffective?, 15 AM REv. INT'L ARB.
439, 463 (2004).
96. Jason Webb Yackee (Richard B. Bilder, Ed.), Recent Book on International Low: Book Review, 103 A.J.I.L.
629, 630 (2009) (reviewing GUILLERMo AGUILAR ALVAREz & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE REASONS RE-
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ship. 04 The following are factors to be included in the evaluation: when the transaction
was made, pre-contract expenses, territorial questions, claims for injuries to direct subsidi-
aries, and host country approval requirements.105
NAFTA is perhaps the only multilateral treaty in which a sufficient number of arbitra-
tions have occurred for the construction of a substantive body of arbitral decisions.
Within that body of case law, there has been some criticism that the ICSID Rules, when
applied to arbitrations under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, have sometimes resulted in inconsis-
tent decisions.10 6 However, one commentator has predicted that, over time, "there will be
a convergence in jurisprudence resulting in some level of consistency. As of yet, it is
unclear whether this convergence is taking place, given that some of the areas where there
is urged to be an inconsistency are still at an early stage of development."10 7
A. EXPROPRIATION DAMAGES
Compensation for expropriation of a foreign investment by a host nation is a controver-
sial area of international law because of the broad range of possible remedies and because
of its relationship to property rights.108 In awarding expropriation damages, tribunals at
the ICSID generally assess compensation according to the estimated lost profits the in-
jured investor would have earned from the investment, which employs the familiar "expec-
tation measure" from U.S. contract law.109 But sometimes, ICSID tribunals have granted
recovery for actual losses, meaning the costs of the investment, much as a domestic court
might award "reliance measure" damages." 0 While the reasoning for the tribunals' deci-
sions to fix damages according to losses incurred as opposed to gains foregone is often
unclear, there is a sound economic justification for a reliance-based standard of compensa-
tion."' Calculation of damages based upon actual investment figures should result in less
error than trying to estimate the amount of profits lost because of the expropriation and it
should also provide for more confidentiality of sensitive information. These two factors
should help to promote the continuation of foreign direct investment in the future, one of
the principal goals of the ICSID's dispute resolution process.112
B. REVIEW OF ICSID ARBTrRAL DECISIONS
Unlike the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, no judicial review is allowed under the IC-
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However, Article 52 allows an award to be annulled by an ad hoc committee of three
different arbitrators if the challenged award "failed to state the reasons on which it was
based.""14 If an award is annulled, a third, new tribunal must be formed to re-decide the
annulled points of the original award. The Article 52 annulment process thus provides
both the formal and the practical impetus for an arbitrator to thoroughly explain the rea-
sons for his decision.s15
The ICSID Convention's Article 52 review process is an internal annulment mecha-
nism;"16 the domestic court system is not affected.11 7 In a UNCITRAL appeal, the court
may consider the substantive correctness of the arbitrator's decision and is permitted to
substitute its view; but, under the ICSID Convention, an annulment voids the arbitrator's
decision partially or fully, and the case is sent to a new tribunal for a new decision." 8 The
five grounds for annulment are "(1) the original arbitral tribunal was not properly consti-
tuted; (2) the arbitral tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers; (3) a tribunal member was
corrupt; (4) there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (5) the
award does not state the reasons upon which it was based.""l 9 The mere fact that an
arbitrator made a mistake of law or fact cannot justify the annulment of an award because
neither of those is an enumerated ground.120
The United States of America has been pushing for judicial review of ISA decisions
because it perceives ISA to be somewhat of an encroachment upon its sovereignty.121 As a
result, recent BITs entered into by the United States and at least twenty other nations
have included a judicial review provision.122 In direct response to that trend, in 2004 the
ICSID published a discussion paper entitled "Possible Improvements of the Framework
for ICSID Arbitration," which sought to begin the creation of an appeals mechanism to be
administered by the ICSID.123 The main justification mentioned in that paper was to
foster coherence and consistency in the case law emerging under BITs.124 If there are to
be appeals, then the suggestion of a single appeals mechanism administered by the ICSID
seemed logical.125 However, the drive toward creation of the ICSID appeals procedure
was seemingly slowed in 2005 when another working paper was issued, "Suggested
Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations."l 26 Although the second paper suggests
that the ICSID will continue to consider an appellate procedure, it also stated it would be
premature to presently attempt to establish such a procedure "because of the difficult
technical and policy issues." 27
114. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 9, at 1547.
115. Pierre Lalive, On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards, 1 J. OF INT'L DIsPUTE SErn.ENT
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C. RECENT CHANGES TO THE ICSID RULES
The dramatic increase in ISA using the ICSID Rules during the past decade led ICSID
to implement several reforms in 2006.128 The amendments were intended to "make the
proceedings more streamlined and transparent, while instilling greater confidence in the
arbitral process."' 29 With the new amendments, "the rules now provide for preliminary
procedures concerning provisional measures, expedited procedures for dismissal of un-
meritorious claims, access of non-disputing parties to proceedings, publication of awards,
and additional disclosure requirements for arbitrators."130 No judicial review was in-
cluded in the reforms.131
One commentator has suggested that the ICSID Rules should be further amended to
consider environmental, public health, and labor concerns. 132 She argues this would result
in an investment regime that promotes the interests of both investors and host states. 133
VII. Recommendations
A. DEVELOPING NATIONS SHOULD PURSUE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIEs
The following reasons justify developing nations' continued pursuit of BITs:
1. Developing countries should sign BITs with developed nations in order to promote
foreign investment and to increase the financial, technological, managerial, and
other resources flowing to their territories.134 The BIT should contain understanda-
ble and enforceable rules designed to protect the interests of all parties; if investors
perceive that the rules safeguard their investments, more investment should occur.135
A BIT between a developed and a developing country is a mutually-beneficial agree-
ment, a pledge of protection of the investor's capital in exchange for the prospect of
receipt of more capital in the future.136
2. Developing countries should sign BITs with developed nations because those agree-
ments may facilitate their attainment of other benefits and favors in the future.137
Even if a developing nation fails to realize increased investment flows from its devel-
oped-country treaty partner, the BIT will often result in a closer relationship with
the developed country that, in turn, may lead to increased trade, foreign aid, security
assistance, technology transfers, or other benefits.138
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3. Developing countries should sign BITs as part of their efforts to liberalize their
economies and thereby promote economic growth. 139 Traditionally, developing
countries have emphasized central economic planning by the government, state en-
terprises, a high degree of regulation of the private sector (if it was allowed to exist),
and restrictions on international trade and foreign direct investment. Commencing
in the late 1980s, most developing nations adopted the neo-liberal economic model,
known as the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus emphasizes a
free market economy instead of state economic planning, the private sector as the
primary component of economic growth instead of the public sector, avoidance of
excessive regulation of the private sector, and encouragement of international trade
and foreign direct investment. Developing countries have viewed BITs as an impor-
tant instrument in implementation of the Washington Consensus model. 40 And
from the developed nations' perspective, BITs are often used as a mechanism to facil-
itate liberalization of the economies of developing countries.141
4. As economic liberalization is pursued and BITs are entered into by developing coun-
tries, entrepreneurs in developing countries will be encouraged to pursue their risk-
taking ventures. Economic liberalization will send a signal to those business firms
that their government wants them to succeed. BITs will also encourage those firms
because it will show the commitment of their government to protect the capital of
foreigners. 142
5. Developing countries often have deficient legal systems. Because of this, developing
countries should enter into BITs in order to correct some of the drawbacks in their
legal systems and in their enforcement of the rule of law. BITs can become interna-
tional substitutes for deficient domestic legal systems. What is the rationale for this
conclusion? When a developing country enters into a BIT, its authorities voluntarily
agree not to act in an arbitrary and capricious manner toward foreign investors; this
attitude should, in turn, lead them to avoid being arbitrary and capricious toward
their own nationals; and eventually, those authorities should experience improved
governance and a greater respect for the rule of law.143
6. Developing countries should avoid multilateral investment treaties with developed
nations. BITs are much more common than multilateral treaties because they allow
the developing country to enter into treaties only with nations possessing the specific
financial, technological, managerial and other resources that they specifically need
VIII. Developing Nations Should Include Investor-State Arbitration (Using
ICSID Rules) in its Bilateral Investment Treaties
Although mediation and other methods can also be used in resolution of FDI dis-
putes,144 Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) has become the most commonly used resolution
139. Id. at 160.
140. Salacuse, Treatfyication, supra note 5, at 160.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 161.
143. Id.
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device 145 Since 1995, the number of arbitrations pursuant to investment treaties has in-
creased dramatically and the number of those decisions is approaching one hundred.146
One of the criticisms of ISA is that it does not allow the host country to apply its law in
dealing with the dispute.147 But this criticism is outweighed by the advantages afforded by
ISA.148
Accordingly, developing countries should agree to ISA (using ICSID Rules) in their
BITs for the following reasons:
1. International arbitrators are often uniquely skilled in evaluating complex business
transactions and the risks they might pose.149 "If countries are often willing to trust
international arbitration to handle issues as important as nuclear non-proliferation,
they should be willing to accept this forum to resolve their international investment
disputes." 50 Arbitrators are often much more knowledgeable of the business
problems in a specific industry than a judge in the host country with little or no
experience in that industry.1st
2. If international arbitration is chosen as the dispute resolution mechanism, investors
and host states will incur more flexibility because a number of factors may be used as
the justification for a decision. 5 2 Arbitrators avoid strict adherence to any one rule
of law; they can focus on general legal principles. Therefore, arbitration often re-
sults in greater fulfillment of investors' needs while simultaneously protecting the
security interests of the host state. 5 3
3. Arbitration is a private forum that allows parties to protect business secrets and other
confidences, regardless of whether the secrets would qualify for special protection
under judicial procedures.1 54 Both the investor and the host country desire to pro-
tect classified information, and arbitration provides for that. 55
4. The availability of ISA to resolve disputes is a positive factor taken into account by
potential investors and will indirectly promote FDI through its positive impact on
the rule of law.156 Foreign investors will have more incentive to invest because they
will know there will be an objective forum to resolve disputes. 57
5. ISA will promote judicial economy in that it will protect the courts of the developing
nations from having to shoulder the burden of resolving onerous, time-consuming
BIT claims.
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6. Developing nations are encouraged to become a signatory to the ICSID Convention.
Thereafter, the ICSID Arbitration Rules should be used in all BITs entered into by
those nations. As mentioned above, the ICSID Rules have several important advan-
tages over the UNCITRAL Rules; one of these is that they do not allow for judicial
review, which increases the degree of finality of the arbitrator's decision. The objec-
tives of finality and correctness are not contradictory. When excellent arbitrators are
employed, correctness becomes less of an issue and finality remains workable. 58
IX. Conclusions
1. Developing nations should promote foreign investment in order to gain access to
financial, technological, managerial, and other resources that they need.
2. Accordingly, developing nations should pursue bilateral investment treaties with for-
eign countries whose business firms possess those resources.
3. Developing nations' investment laws need to be fine-tuned in order to maximize
growth and investment.
4. In each bilateral treaty, a developing nation should agree to investor-state arbitration
as the dispute resolution mechanism to be employed whenever a disagreement arises
between the developing nation's government and private business firms of the other
country.
5. Developing nations should become a signatory to the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention.
6. In any investor-state arbitration hearing that arises, the developing nation should
insist on the utilization of Rules adopted by the ICSID Convention.
158. Laird et al., supra note 35, at 302.
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